3.2 Case Study 2
Communication channels

Outline

HQ decides to publish the report, based on the information they will receive from the Bureau, themselves. They need to establish a secure channel of communication with the Bureau and make sure that the project continues until completion, or for as long as possible. There is an understanding that security is a primary issue here and they have allocated a budget of 5,000 USD to the Bureau especially for this cause. The project needs to survive attempts by the local forces to compromise, restrict or destroy it completely. The Bureau is to undergo a review of its methods of collecting and communicating information as well as of building a security policy for all staff to implement.

It is decided that all staff undergo information security training by a local expert and do their own study and research in security issues on the Internet. Case studies, witness reports and other information on torture cases they may uncover will be stored on paper and in electronic format. Field reporters will communicate their findings by bringing back a collection of notes taken during the mission, and by making daily reports from an Internet café. In other words, all information will be duplicate in physical and electronic format.

The office comprises a rented apartment in the centre of the city. There are two computers and an Internet connection. The staff are well-acquainted with the neighbours and enjoy their support. The office had previously been broken into, although nothing of importance was taken.

Threats

HQ

The Bureau

Field workers

Solutions

Communication

Three distinct channels of communicating with HQ are established. There is an open channel, where information is communicated in an insecure fashion – by telephone, post and regular email. It is important to have an open channel, so that the monitoring bodies can be satisfied of having ready access to the project communications. Information passed through the open channel is not sensitive and would include typical administrative and organisational data.

A private channel will provide for sensitive and secure communications. It will be used for exchanging information about cases, witness reports and organisational strategy. It is decided to use a secure webmail solution and Pidgin with the OTR plug-in for instant messaging¹⁰⁶. No sensitive information will be passed by telephone, fax or insecure email. The private channel will not be used regularly so as not to attract too much attention.

The above channels require a functioning Internet connection for communica- tion. It is agreed that HQ will not suffer from Internet shortages and a back- up channel is devised for the Bureau and their field workers, in case the Internet stops working or is disconnected. The backup channel will involve the Bureau workers using a nearby Internet café. They will use portable versions of the necessary software, as obtained from the Digital Security Toolkit and carry it with them on USB memory sticks. They have received assurance from the Internet café owner, that the computers are free of viruses. In any case, staff will use public computers with caution.

A graphical schematic for the Bureau’s communications system

Information

Office

Office security will include a rigorous policy for the staff, strengthening of entry points to the building and general upkeep to make sure that the chances for computer crashes are reduced. Physical documents will need to be kept in a safe, and wasted paper will need to be properly destroyed. It must be taken into account that computers and other office equipment could be damaged or confiscated, so a reserve fund is maintained to allow the organisation to purchase new equipment and resume work should this occur.

Detailed responses to threats

Information threats

Multiple layers of data backupconfiscated, the documents can at least make it back to the office

• Virus attacks or hacking: To prevent the loss of data through a virus attack or hacking, the Bureau installs the Avast4 anti-virus software on all computers and laptops. The software is free for non-profit organisations and updates automatically when the computer is connected to the Internet. They also install Spybot to counteract other malicious software and the Comodo firewall to prevent hackers from intruding into their computers. All software and explanations are found on the Digital Security Toolkit. A strong policy on viruses is introduced, ensuring that nobody opens suspicious-looking email messages or uses an external diskette in a computer without scanning it with the anti-virus software first.


• Computers confiscation: If the computers are confiscated with official warrants or otherwise, the organisation must have the means to continue its operation. It will be necessary to purchase new computers, and money must be allowed in the budget for this. Even one computer will suffice if
  the circumstances demand it. The staff source a computer retailer who will sell a new computer for 1000 USD. Needless to say, a backup of the files and documents will be required to bring the organisation back to its original state and allow the project to continue.


• Theft of documents, equipment: A strict key policy is introduced and only those in need of possessing office keys are given a copy. No additional copies can be made without general consensus. All computers are switched off at night and a safe for files is purchased at 300 USD. All CDs, diskettes and paper with sensitive information on it is kept in the safe. Measures are implemented to make sure that no unwanted persons could sneak into the office. The windows are within ground level and will be protected with metal bars. The door is also strengthened and a peep hole installed. A local company agrees to do both services for 500 USD.


• Loss of Internet connectivity: It is possible that the Internet is disabled from use for the Bureau. This could be the result of pressure on the Internet Service Provider or a malfunction of the network itself. To counteract, the staff decide to use an Internet café. Should the interruption to the office Internet connection prove long-term, 500 USD is set aside as emergency fund to for using the Internet café. A USB memory card will be used to transmit files between the office and the Internet café.


• Communications monitored: If the surveillance infrastructure of N is sufficiently advanced, they will be monitoring email that comes in and out of the country. The Bureau has a suspicion that their email is sensitive enough to warrant its monitoring and switch over to using a secure SSL webmail service. They register two accounts at https://www.riseup.net¹⁰³ and use one for communicating with HQ and one for the field workers. All information is passed to the headquarters daily via email. Since the connection to the webmail client is over SSL (HTTPs), it is encrypted. The Bureau staff research the possibility of Man-in-the-Middle attacks and are careful checking the certificates presented by the website.


• Website and email blocked: If the government decides to block Internet access to the HQ website and to the RiseUP webmail, an alternative must be found. The Bureau employees can find other secure webmail providers or employ a number of circumvention methods to bypass these blocks. It is decided to ask headquarters to install the Psiphon tool on their PCs at home. Relevant IP addresses and login details are passed to the Bureau. These provides a secure way to circumvent to government's blocks and provide access to the HQ servers.


• Computer technician: A previously tried and tested consultant from a computer company will visit the office twice a month for general administration and will be on call for emergency situations. The fee will be 1,000 USD for 6 month.